An Appreciation

Drid Williams

For [contemporary] social anthropologists, the important conclusion, always worth repeating, is that the observation and the labelling of 'behaviour' are inseparable from the importation of socially derived meanings - even when observing monkeys. How much more so when the process is reflexive, when the observers and the observed are both 'meaning-makers' ...


I began writing about “Savages and Deaf-Mutes” (Baynton, supra, pp. 139-173) both stimulated and refreshed -- and with a valuable section of Ardener's essay, Comprehending Others, (1989[1977]) in mind, because the high regard in which I hold Baynton's work is rooted in life-long preoccupations with beliefs and ideologies that deeply affect dancers and the study of dancing. In many ways these are similar to the ways in which evolutionary theory affected American Sign Language (hereafter ASL) and sign-talkers. In particular, I was reminded of problems to which Ardener draws attention, but before we arrive at those, preparation is required. Suffice to say Baynton's work renders into high relief Ardener's observation about conclusions, stated in the epigraph.

Preliminaries

One of the striking features about Baynton's essay is the awareness that here is an author who makes people who lived in the past (oralists, manualists and the deaf population in the United States) emerge from the pages and seem real. I could easily imagine how deaf students half way through their formal primary or secondary education might have felt when they discovered that the manual sign language in which they were proficient was no longer to be used in class. Indeed, their method of communicating and understanding was abolished because it was thought to be "damaging" (p. 139). No matter how painful or discouraging, they now had to learn to communicate orally. Their teachers could no longer use sign-language in class. What a shock that must have been! One wonders how much confusion and bitterness the new directives generated, even though sign language was vigorously defended, and, ultimately, the oralist movement failed (p. 139).
While Baynton's discussion in this essay is confined to one of the problems sign-talkers had during a recent period of history in the U. S.,¹ his argument applies to other groups of people as well. The problems I usually talk about are those of dancers -- ballet dancers (see Williams 1995: 44-81), Australian Aboriginal dancers (Williams 1991a) and Ghanaians (Williams 1967 and 1993), among others -- which is to say (using commonplace 19th century evolutionary terms) that both of us talk about the movement systems of "savages" and "primitives." Dancers and sign-talkers are often categorized with each other because both use the medium of movement for communicative purposes. What, then, do dancers and sign-talkers share?

"Evolutionary theory fostered a perception of sign languages as inferior to spoken languages, fit only for "savages" and not for civilized human beings" (Baynton, p. 139). Likewise, evolutionary theory fostered a perception of dancing as an inferior activity in western cultures. Evolutionary theory undoubtedly had profound impacts on the lives and education of deaf people, but it had equally disastrous repercussions on dancers and dancing. For example, Darwin insisted that human beings

[S]hared many expressions in common with animals... and the origins of human expression were to be found in their animal ancestors. Indeed, the similarities between humans and other animals in this regard was itself additional evidence that humans "one existed in a much lower and animal-like condition (Darwin 1872: 10). In short, facial expression was no longer distinctly human, but, like gesture, a mere vestige of our animal past (Baynton p. 162).

Elsewhere, I have pointed out parallel concerns with regard to dancing:

[His] principle of natural selection has strong functional implications, which may account for the popularity of his ideas as infra-structural explanations of... dances [and dancing]. ... Although I agree with Callan that Darwin's thought is unquestionably "[A]n obvious landmark for anyone studying the development of evolutionary thought in the nineteenth century as it affected both the biological and social science of the future" (1970: 13), I have strong reservations about an application of his principles of natural selection regarding the activity of dancing. What, simply stated, might the Darwinian position look like?

Over long periods of time and through mutation, Darwin believed that animals acquire characteristics which enable them to deal more or less effectively with their environments. Their characteristics are described as distinctive features that contribute to the organism's or animal's perpetuation. The biological system and the physical body is primary, because "functions" maintain the system and "structures" (i.e. fins, paws, claws, arms and legs) perform functions. The biological, system-
maintaining characteristics of movements, especially those pertaining to erotic propitiation and mating, were seen as ‘dancing’, and were thus seen as extensions of the structures that maintain the system and perpetuate the organism or animal as a species (Williams 1991b: 54).

Many claims have been made about the relevance of phylogenetic histories of biological organisms and animals to our common understanding of the social histories of humanity. Equally many claims have been made with reference to the relevance of a purely biological study of the behavior of animals emphasizing their “species-preserving functions” and their use of “gesture-language” to the actions of human beings, regardless of whether the system of actions is danced or signed.

There are several points at issue, of course, but to me, the most important is an issue of procedure. How valid are general conclusions about human social histories or human activities like dancing and sign language when they are lifted (sometimes en toto) from the theoretical and methodological frameworks of the non-human sciences?

The oralist movement in deaf education, Baynton tells us, “[W]as symptomatic of a new understanding of human history—and of the place of sign language in that history…” at the end of the 19th century (p. 140), forcefully reminding us again how so-called ‘abstractions’ in the form of profound ideas about the nature and character of humanity are transformed into sets of beliefs and/or ideologies that affect what we think and do, and (perhaps more important) what we think we ought to do, individually and socially. Theories of human nature are directly and practically connected, with social, educational and other kinds of policy, whether they are seen to be in agreement with one another or not:

The Bible sees man as created by a transcendent God who has a definite purpose for our life [but] ‘The real nature of man is the totality of social relations’, said Marx (in his theses on Feuerbach in 1845). Marx denied the existence of God and held that each individual is a product of the human society he lives in. ‘Man is condemned to be free’, said Sartre, writing in German-occupied France in the early 1940s. Sartre was as much an atheist as Marx, but (in that period of his thought, at least) he differed from Marx in holding that we are not determined by our society or by anything else. He held that every human individual is completely free to decide for himself what he wants to be and do…. Rival beliefs about human nature are typically embodied in various individual ways of life, and in different political and economic systems (Stevenson 1987: 3-4 - italics added).
Darwin, whose applications of a theory of the evolution of the species by gradually diverting (through natural selection) from common ancestors wasn't the only person to arrive at, or hold, such a theory, of course. But, his (by now) classic work, *The Origin of Species* (1859) finally convinced scientists (and a large majority of European, English and American popular opinion) of the truth of evolutionary theorizing. Baynton cites Darwin's two later books, *The Descent of Man* (1871) and *The Expression of Emotion in Animals and Man* (1872) in which he attempted applications of his theory to humankind, the latter in particular suggesting ethological themes. Two ethologists who were contemporaries of one another; Konrad Lorenz (b. 1903; d. 1989) and Nikolaas Tinbergen (b. 1907; d. 1988) and their followers have in my opinion had as much influence on sign-language and dancing as did Darwin.

Lorenz's speculative theories about man as an animal were largely based on his convictions about 'innate aggression', justified through recognizable continuities of human and animal physiology, and exemplified by the persistence of wars, feuds, gang violence, murder, and such among humankind. Lorenz's relevance to our discussion is that he was one of the originators of what I have called elsewhere "steam-valve theories" of dancing (Williams 1991: 63). He popularized these ideas in a book *On Aggression* (1966).

Apart from several methodological flaws that have been revealed in Lorenz's work (for example, Ashley-Montagu (1973) and the many reasonable doubts that have been raised about how he manages to get from animals to humanity), one of the greatest objections to Lorenz's "innate aggression thesis" lies in the field of ethics. Robert Ardrey, who used and popularized Lorenz's ideas, puts the matter this way:

But we were born of risen apes, not fallen angels, and the apes were armed killers besides. And so what shall we wonder at? Our murders and massacres and missiles, and our irconcilable regiments? Or our treaties whatever they may be worth; our symphonies however seldom they may be played; our peaceful acres, however frequently they may be converted into battlefields; our dreams however rarely they may be accomplished. The miracle of man is not how far he has sunk but how magnificently he has risen. We are known among the stars [whatever that means!] by our poems, not our corpses.

In other words, humanity is innately depraved. Accept Ardrey's thesis, and moral responsibility becomes an illusion — a "dream" never to be realized.
There were (and still are) notable opponents to Lorenz's theory (see Ashley-Montagu 1973), but, I leave readers to discover these writers on their own if they aren't already acquainted, thus drawing these preliminaries to a conclusion with one final thought: although Nikolaas Tinbergen was Lorenz's contemporary and named as one of three scientists who revitalized ethology (Karl von Frisch was the third), he didn't share Lorenz's penchant for speculative generalization. Evidence of this can be found in a published lecture (1968) in which he asked audiences not to concentrate upon the alleged 'results' of ethological research in cases where they are applied to human societies or used politically and socially for comparative reasons. Tinbergen advised looking at the methodology of ethology instead, which is what Ardener did.

Comprehending Others

We may begin with the point at which social anthropology takes over from what for many is a purely observational subject - the study of primates. I am not concerned here with the particular ethological subject-matter, although the problem of the continuity or not of animal into human both in biological structures and communicational modes, is of the first interest.\(^5\) I prefer to start from a different direction.

Reynolds (1975) lists the differing terminologies used by students of social behaviour of the rhesus monkey, *Macaca mulatta*. He shows that the significant units of behaviour are difficult to define, and that it is far from certain that the 'same' inventory of perceived units can be derived from the analyses of various primatologists. In table 11.1, listing four authors' usages (here I label them A, B, C and D) there are sixteen possible behaviour units. In table 11.2, using three authors only (B, C and D) a further eight units emerge. I do not wish to enter into the technical features of this valuable paper, but to draw attention to some of the broader implications of the variations described therein. From the four-author series I give a characteristic selection of behaviour units, described in the following:

<p>| Table 11.1 Units of primate behaviour - 1 |
|-------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>unit</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>hough-hough</td>
<td>hough</td>
<td>bark, pant, roar, threat, growl</td>
<td>'Ho!'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>coo coo</td>
<td>food call</td>
<td>food call</td>
<td>'Kóó'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>eech</td>
<td>screech</td>
<td>screech</td>
<td>'ééé'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>looking directly at opponent</td>
<td>aggressive look</td>
<td>glare or scandalized expression</td>
<td>stares at</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>rigid body posture and stiff legs</td>
<td>haughty walk</td>
<td>slow pacing</td>
<td>holds tail erect</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After Reynolds (1975: 282, table 1)
For the three-author series the following is also a characteristic selection:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Authors A</th>
<th>Authors B</th>
<th>Authors C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>feeding how</td>
<td>food bark</td>
<td>bark</td>
<td>'Ho!'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bark</td>
<td>shrill bark</td>
<td>'Ka!'</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>splutter</td>
<td>gecker</td>
<td>'ik ik ik ...'</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>submissive sit</td>
<td>cat-like sit</td>
<td>looks 'apprehensively' (towards)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11.2 Units of primate behaviour - 2

After Reynolds (1975: 383, table 2).

These examples bring out clearly some immediate problems in the supposedly direct observation of significant behaviour. First, we may note that the human observer's cultural background penetrates even his description of primate behaviour. It is interesting, for example, that a rendering of rhesus vocalization is attempted in several cases. Authors A and B characterize the monkey sounds by approximations from English folk-phonetics. Author D appears at first sight to introduce a more 'international' standard...[but] introduces slightly more graphical confusion than A and B. The impression given by the choices of all three authors is of a conscious, almost literary exoticism...

For author D (who may be from an American milieu) 'Ho!', with its idiosyncratic exclamation marks front and back, presents an exoticism of a different kind, as does his use of both dialetics and repetition to represent length in other examples. Written English contains among its stylistic conventions a loose but not totally open set for the rendering of the outlandish and uncouth. When speakers of a language attempt to represent non-human, or totally alien sounds, they commonly do their linguistic neighbours (whether speakers of non-standard dialects or foreigners) the honour of acting as models. Such neighbours are like 'nature' rather than 'culture' as Lévi-Strauss would point out (see also Leach 1964). There is certainly an archaic, dialectal or Celtic hint about the descriptions of rhesus monkey vocalizations by authors A and B, and a primitive or faintly folk 'Red Indian' flavour about author D's 'Ho!'....

When we confront the attempt to label rhesus utterances, we may well argue that cultural peculiarities are at their most evident when humans try to represent the absence of cultural characteristics. If as Evans-Pritchard (1940) suggested long ago, we define ourselves by opposition to others, then 'the other' is not an open category of infinite possibilities, but is in turn defined by its opposition to ourselves. Each culture inevitably generates its own perception of what is, either as dream or nightmare, its 'other'. We might be tempted to ask in the particular case, why, since a phonetic approximation was being offered, all the well-developed resources of the International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA) were not brought into play. A Japanese scientist would, at least, then not need to know English in order to understand the representation of a rhesus utterance. The use of the IPA would, however, only confuse the matter further, for rhesus phonetics are not human phonetics. (Ardener 1989: 160-162 - italics added).

Nor, we might add, are rhesus kinetics similar to, far less the same as, human kinetics. They are not the same whether it is sign-languages, dances, religious
rites, martial art forms or human rituals that are under consideration. On p.159, Baynton tells us that

A manualist teacher complained of oralists who ridiculed signers for their "monkey-like grimaces..." This was not an entirely new concern, but it carried different connotations for the oralist generation than it had for the manualists. Woodruff complained of the "tendency to grimace in the natural language of the deaf and dumb". His concern was that such uncouth expression (as he called it) was "ungraceful"...that it would "betoken ill-breeding and offend against good taste....".

One can't help wondering if the 'grimaces' of the oralists' metaphors were equivalents to the 'sputter' and 'gecker' units in Table 11.2 above? Ardener's style of linguistic analysis is illuminating:

[W]e see that even when Reynolds's authors abandon a quasi-phonetic notation of articulations for a 'description' of behaviour, they draw the same problems with them into this sphere. We meet here geckering, a term from the world of English dialect. Gecker is meaningless to most modern Southern English-speakers -- its basic usage seems to derive from 'a gesture of ridicule' (see Oxford English Dictionary s.v. geck) I have furthermore heard a primatologist state, no doubt in an unthinking moment, that the 'correct' word for one kind of rhesus grimace was girning. Girn derives from grin by metathesis in South-Western English dialects (Wright 1913: 134). It is known to standard English-speakers (when it is known at all) through the rural folk-custom of holding girning competitions, to discover who can pull the ugliest face while looking through the frame of a horse-collar. Nothing could be more culturally specific than the grotesque grimaces of girning. Its dialect origin no doubt lends it the association with the outlandish required to describe monkey behaviour.

We may press the matter further. For one unit of behaviour, author C chooses gecker, D uses ik, ik, ik, but B selects splutter. It may be thought that splutter at least is a neutral descriptive term, but this belongs to a domain of lexicon which ultimately is as culturally idiosyncratic as gecker. For example, translating terms of this sort between languages can be particularly difficult. Informants state that only this, or only that, is a 'splutter', perhaps with obscure demonstrations - and with careful exegesis on the affective implications without which (or with which) it is not (or is) truly, a splutter. The ethologist's problem is that demeanour is rule-governed in human societies...(these italics are added). The natural-language terms available to cover animal sounds and acoustic gestures are likely to come dressed in highly emotive cultural associations. Animal behaviour is likely to recall uncontrolled, childish or ill-mannered demeanour, and the terms used bring semantic overtones into the supposedly neutral description.5

When we come, therefore, to more elaborate delineations of rhesus activity, as with author C's 'glare or scandalized expression' or B's 'haughty walk' we are in the thick of the ethological problem. If 'haughty walk' is acceptable could we also accept 'sagacious nod' or 'admiring stare' as possible rhesus behaviours?...(Ardener 1989: 162-163).
Ardener is careful to point out that he isn't making jokes at the expense of ethological description (nor do I), but I'm convinced we must become acutely aware of the fundamental problem of descriptive scientific investigation; that of objectivity.

If ethologists aim for objectivity, then it seems to me their use of language serves rather to undermine their purpose than fulfill it. If an ethologist should attempt to persuade us that the conceptual fields for the movements of animals are the same as (or even strongly similar to) the conceptual fields for human actions, then they really argue on the side of those of us who emphasize the discrete, non-continuous types of logical and semantic complexity involved. The ethologists’ dependence on human conceptual terms does not destroy, it emphasizes the differences between language-users and speech-less creatures.

Not unexpectedly, the protagonists of the oralist/manualist debates to which Baynton draws our attention didn't look to the methodologies of zoologists, biologists and ethologists they aligned themselves with — or rejected. Perhaps, in the middle of the 19th century, Darwin's ideas were still too new. Yet, this is the first area into which modern investigators might inquire, following Tinbergen's advice. If they do, they will sooner or later expose the poverty of a notion of human movement that jumps from the unstructured (i.e. non-linguified) movements of animal behaviors through alleged examples of 'concepts', e.g. 'motivation' (as in territoriality, mating, etc.), which is how we are supposed to get from animal behavior to the linguified actions of human beings. This 'leap' from unstructured forms of animal behavior to structured systems of human actions, nearly always stated in programmatic, speculative terms, is just where the problems for communities of dancers and sign-talkers began in the middle of the 19th century and still begins today.

Human movement studies has managed to rid itself of some, but by no means all, of its behavioristic and primotological 'cargo', so to speak, but there is still a long way to go (see Farnell 1995 and 1996; Varela 1996; Urciuoli 1996 and Williams 1996). If ethological methodologies are followed out, for example, one finds that, at best, they can only lead to a type of human ethology which can only produce semantically null research results — a limited
area of investigation in semasiology that I and my colleagues think of as ‘kinology’ (Williams 1996: 209).

Ardener first analyzed, then demonstrated, the somewhat absurd outcome of using words and phrases from natural human language to describe primate behavior. “It is an issue of critical importance”, he says, "if natural language has already prejudged the issue by ‘contaminating’ the descriptive instruments with evidence of humanity” (1989: 163 - italics added). The anthropological conclusion about such practices has already been stated in the epigraph, but it bears repeating: “[T]he observation and the labelling of ‘behaviour’ are inseparable from the importation of [human] socially derived meanings -- even when observing monkeys” (1989: 163).

If we use the terms ‘dance’, ‘gesture-language’, ‘haughty’ ‘perform’, ‘symbolize’, ‘scandalize’, ‘act’ and others with reference to animals, is it with the same sense and the same implications that these terms are employed in human contexts? I argue it is not, precisely because “The ethologists problem is that demeanour is rule-governed in human societies” (Ardener 1989: 163 - italics added).

Behaviorism

Ethological and behavioral accounts of human movement systems have demonstrably failed in the past to account for most of the basic features of human action-sign systems, in particular, dances and sign-language. The features to which I refer are higher-order structuring capacities, the faculty for language-use, graphic systems of notation for human actions, inter-subjective understanding, second-, and higher-order self-monitoring, -- to name only a few. Harré and Secord (1972), Hockett (1963), Hampshire (1965), Douglas (1973: introductory essay), and many others, have drawn attention to these human characteristics and to reflexivity (see Crick 1976; Pocock 1994 and Williams 1995), intention (Best 1987), rules (Winch 1958: 25-39 and 57-66), movement literacy (Farnell 1991 and 1994), indexicality (Urciuoli 1995), the rationality of feeling (Best 1992) and the problems of objectivity and causality (Varela 1994 and 1995).

I partially enumerate human faculties and capacities that make the absence
of human sociocultural characteristics in primate behavior painfully obvious for the benefit of those who may simply take them for granted. Behaviorism, as an over-arching theoretical and methodological paradigm for animal and human alike is simply no longer viable:

Along the way it has been necessary to leave behind encumbrances of an ethological nature to which even Hall's proxemics was prone, as well as some problematic assumptions from psychologistic and naive universalist perspectives. Ethological approaches, though they usually recognize species-specific cognitive abilities, implicitly allow the faculty for language use to "stop at the neck" as if such faculties somehow don't apply to our actions or our conceptions of those actions [Farnell 1995: 9].

In a later publication, this author points out the historical reasons why ethology's "encumbrances" had to be left behind:

Beginning with Chomsky's famous review of B.F. Skinner's work in 1957, behaviorism was long ago exposed as a philosophical failure and largely abandoned because it is theoretically sterile. It hasn't been a central topic of theoretical discussion in psychology, sociology or anthropology since the late 1960s. For the benefit of interested readers, I will select just a few representative examples.

Charles Taylor's *The Explanation of Behavior* (1964) provided the first important shifts in psychology away from "behavior" toward "action". During the 1970s, Taylor developed this theme to include social theory as we shifted from "action" to "social action" (see Taylor 1971). Harre and Secord's, *The Explanation of Social Behaviour* (1972) was a seminal contribution to these developments and Ardener (1973) provided an important critique of the term "behavior" for social anthropologists. In the 1980s, "social action" was re-defined as being constituted by discursive/conversational practices, the current theoretical task being to ensure that analyses of such practices include embodied action (see Farnell 1995). Within psychology, behaviorism (itself a paradigm shift away from introspection and Wundt's structural approach) was superceded by cognitive science, which has also taken a discursive turn in what Harré and Gillet (1994) call a "second cognitive revolution" (see also Bruner 1990)....

With reference to the same subject, Varela remarks that the

[P]roblem has already been settled by the end of the 'sixties and definitively so by the close of the 'seventies. Thus, the end (and therefore the irrelevance) of behaviorism is a philosophical and scientific "done-deal". Behaviorism in any strict sense that involves a positivist justification of its preference for 'behavior' as against 'action' is conceptually vacuous.... 'Behaviorism' and therefore 'behavior', are words that can only be of nominal significance and/or nostalgic value (1996: 368).
In revealing how a physical anthropologist who is a self-confessed behaviorist misreads the work of modern human action analysts, Urciuoli tells us,

This book is not about physical movement per se. It is about the inter-subjective construction of significant actions in a complex of social relations, and its contributors seek to take these concerns into a realm where they had not been taken previously. This is where indexicality and, more specifically, deixis enter the picture. Meaning emerges in significant action in ways that are systematically linked to the performer’s or signer’s or speaker’s relation to an audience or addressee; in short, it requires consideration of an axis linking I or we to you in opposition to her, him, it or them. Such meaning cannot be purely indexical (that is, cannot simply indicate some existential connection), it has to be classified in some larger cultural scheme of meaning (Urciuoli 1996: 365).

Other Sign Languages

From an anthropological viewpoint, Baynton’s section on competing theories of history (supra, pp. 150-152) is of special interest. We learn that as far as oralists were concerned, American schools were

[F]ortunately able now to give our deaf children a better means of communication with men than that employed by the American Indian or the African savage (Wright 1897: 333-334).

I think there is a sense in which the deaf themselves were thought to be subhuman because their sign language “came to be itself a sub-human characteristic....To sign was to step downward in the scale of being” (Baynton p. 164). The oralists’ position was supported by the fact that so-called “inferior races” also used sign language — and of course, they danced — which only strengthened the prevailing racist point of view. Language was conceived to be an important characteristic of humanity, but it did not define humanity. To manualists, spoken language seems to have been secondary, for it was merely the means of expression through which the light of the soul shone through. To oralists, it was the characteristic evolutionary achievement of superior races. One wonders how Asian sign languages or Asian deaf populations were classified? With regard to dancing, Asian dance forms and the people who perform them occupy an ambiguous position, for they are usually placed somewhere between Africans, Aborigines and Native American dance forms
and western ballet and contemporary modern concert dance forms in evolutionary schemes.

Baynton has done an excellent job of pointing out the affects of ideas (in particular those seeking to define humanity, its nature and character) on living populations of people, but he has done so without engaging his readers in a rhetoric of victimization or oppression. He has likewise exposed flaws in evolutionary thinking where it became attached to alleged ranking systems of sociopolitical progression (i.e. ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ races). He has done so, however, without turning Darwin into a ridiculous figure; making him out to be the malicious progenitor of all the problems deaf people might have or assigning ‘blame’, and that is commendable.

Finally, being able to look at the oralist/manualist debates from the late 19th century, provides modern human movement specialists with ‘lenses’ through which they might examine current over-arching evolutionary ideas. I wonder, for example, in how far Bronowski’s Ascent of Man, written in 1974, differs from Darwin’s Descent of Man, written in 1871? As Baynton points out, theories of history can include theories of continual progression (either towards improvement or decline), or civilizations can be seen to ‘rise’ and ‘fall’ (supra, pp. 150-152). On the other hand, in seeking “origins”, a theory of history might specify a single characteristic of language, such as “sign language was superceded long ago by speech”, as the oralists believed, thus consigning expressive gestural systems of any kind to extinction (supra, p. 151).

The latter theory reminds me of a Dutch theologian writing about the dance in the middle of the 20th century, although he didn’t condemn dancing to extinction. Instead, van der Leeuw elevated it to an asinine “monolithic position” in the general scheme of things, which ultimately denies dancers and dances any possibility of change:

The art of beautiful motion is far and away the oldest. Before man learned how to use any instruments at all, he moved the most perfect instrument of all, his body. He did this with such abandon that the cultural history of prehistoric and ancient man is, for the most part nothing but the history of dance. We must understand this literally. Not only is prehistory mostly dance history, but dance history is mostly prehistory. Like a giant monolith, the dance stands in the midst of the changing forms of human expression. (van der Leeuw 1963: 13).
Feeling sure Baynton would agree, I can only conclude with a remark made earlier on: there is still a long way to go, whether sign languages or dances provide the subject of discussion.

NOTES

1 His forthcoming book Forbidden Signs: American Culture and the Campaign Against Sign Language, University of Chicago Press, including a version of “Savages and Deaf-Mutes” (supra) as Chapter 2, deals with several aspects of the problem, focusing on the same period of history.

2 The full title of this book is The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle of Life -- a title summarizing the central idea of the volume.

3 Etymologically, the word, ‘ethology’ originally meant the study of character, however, it came to be used to mean the scientific study of animal behavior.

4 We can smash dishes to vent our rage; we can channel aggressive tendencies and competitive drives into team games and we can both vent emotions and sublimate aggressive tendencies by dancing.

5 Ardener’s notes, except where quoted, as below, are deleted, and in some cases, I have condensed his text.

6 [Ardener’s note]: For the development of the term ‘behaviour’ in scientific usage, see Ardener (1989[1973]). The term always meant ‘socially-ordered activity’. Its appearance in scientific use in the 1850s represented a demonstration that nature was orderly. ‘Behaviour’ was subsequently also used to denote an activity for which the demonstration of orderliness was only an aspiration - thus the paradox of ‘random behaviour’, and the desocialization of the term.
Ardener, E.W.


Ashley-Montagu, M.F. (Ed.).

Best, David


Bronowski, Jacob

Bruner, Jerome

Crick, Malcolm

Darwin, Charles


Douglas, Mary (Ed.)
Evans-Pritchard, E.E.

Farnell, Brenda

Hampshire, Stuart

Harré, Rom and Peter Secord

Harré Rom and Grant Gillett

Hockett, Charles F.

Leach, E.R.

Leeuw, G. van der

Lorenz, Konrad

Pocock, David

Reynolds, V.

Stevenson, Leslie
Taylor, Charles

Tinbergen, Nikolaas

Urciuoli, Bonnie

Varela, Charles

Williams, Drid

Winch, Peter