EDITORIAL FOREWORD

In this issue we are pleased to offer our readers articles that address theoretical issues central to the anthropological study of human movement. David Best deals with dualism, discussing philosophical problems that arise with the continued use of this dominant doctrine of the relationship between body and mind in Western thought. Behaviorism, although it rejects dualism, presents an equally problematic position. The author uses insights from Wittgenstein's philosophy to counter both positions, for he doesn't agree with dualism or Behaviorism. He applies all of this to the common understanding of relations between thinking and moving in the domain of sports. The philosophical and moral issues, however, can be seen to apply to any effort to understand any human movement system, not only sports. While there are differences, for example, in dramaturgical and agonistic models of overall events, the upshot of sport, for example, being which team wins or loses, in contrast to, for example, dances, where representation is the aim, Best talks about something deeper -- the still-governing, and largely misconceived ideas we have of relations between body and mind.

Varela compares and contrasts two conceptions of the body and physical being to be found in Harré's ethogenic standpoint and Williams's semasiology. As the author points out, the central paradox in the ethogenic standpoint is this: "while causal powers theory is the basis of the conception of discursive practices, and embodiment is certainly taken to be constitutive of such practices, the body that is featured in ethogenics is not a moving body. The conception of discursive practices certainly involves the idea of the agency of embodied persons but it does not explicitly involve the idea of the genuine agency of embodiment -- not in the strict sense of Williams's conception of the action-sign" (see infra, p. 223). He concludes that despite the fact that both theories share a commitment to causal powers theory and the notions of 'person', agency and embodiment, this interesting paradox arises. With typical incisiveness, from a standpoint of intimate knowledge of both theoreticians and their work, Varela identifies and analyses both conceptions of the body.

Williams's review is, on the whole, self-explanatory, but the discussion emerged from problems with ethogenics in its latest form, explained in
Physical Being: A Theory of Corporeal Psychology. Concepts of embodiment, of the relationships between 'mind' and 'body', and how we talk about these is crucial to any 'progress' we may think we have made in human movement studies.

The Editors