Our method(s) of approaching the vast field of human movement studies consists, not of a unitary descriptive "grid" into which we force highly variant cultural data. Rather, we aim to encourage the point of view that "unity" will perhaps emerge from seeing the ordered relations between variants and contexts. This is possible only if one sees "variety," including sometimes incompatible ideologies and beliefs perceived in the systems on the ground, not as deviations from an assumed "norm," but as manifestations of intricate sets of rules that, at base, can be seen to reiterate a linguistic truism: the medium (in this case, movement) is the message (Williams 1982: 162-63).

'Movement' or 'Action'?

In semasiology, the broad, ambiguous term 'movement' is separated into two fields, i.e. 'behaviors' which are taken to imply mechanical, causal accounts of movements which are appropriate when agency is either absent or (in a human being) temporarily or permanently destroyed. In contrast, 'actions' are taken to be movements or comprehensive sets of movements which have agency, that is, intentions, language-use, meanings, rules. Thus there are organisms and/or animals which monitor their behavior on an elementary or first order level in terms of movement. However, human beings are conceived of as agents ('actors', 'persons') whose actions reflect an hierarchy of powers (see Harré and Madden 1975). That is to say that human actions exist in systems consisting of reflexivity, simply stated, as people possessing the power to be conscious of being conscious of being conscious -- and so on. From a semasiological point of view, we say that animals 'live' or 'exist' but human beings have conceptions of living or existing. Because of this they 'act'. They do not merely 'behave'. It follows that 'to act' is to be able to have models of 'behaving' (Williams 1975: xvi).

An axiom of semantic anthropology is that in dealing with human actions, one is dealing with actions which are suffused with meanings. From this point of view, a scientific description which ignores the meanings of actions is purely metaphysical in a pejorative sense and is not scientifically realistic. If it is true that human beings are language users; that they are rule-, role-, and meaning-makers, then these facts have profound consequences regarding what a human scientific investigation amounts to. Not only does the investigation itself involve symbolic interchange, the objects of semasiological investigation are usually systems of human symbolic exchange (Williams 1975: xiv).

Reflexivity

At the simplest level of our enquiries, we start by asking, "how would the people of some other culture or the users of some other body language expect me to behave if I were a member of that culture or wanted to use their body language?" We ask this because we believe that to explicate the rules of the body language of 'x' is to provide a few beginning answers to that question and at the same time lay the groundwork for a low-level theory of that body language. Because we advocate a self-critical style of anthropological study, we constantly compare the rules of 'x' with the known rules of our own idioms, thus the knowledge that emerges is of a basically reflexive nature (Williams 1982: 164).
One of the strongest ‘roots’ of semasiology is reflexivity: first offered to social anthropologists in a paper entitled ‘The Idea of a Personal Anthropology’ contributed to the 1973 conference of the ASA (held in Oxford) by David Pocock. This essay had profound influences on me and on semasiological theory, but because of opposition to Pocock’s idea, the paper was not published until 1994. As it was published in JASHM, 8(1): 11-42, no more need be said about it here, since the complete work is readily available. Nevertheless, it is an idea worth thinking about because it raises the issue of ‘objectivity’ (see Varela 1994: 43-64).

At the same conference, Ardener contributed his now well-known essay ‘Some Outstanding Problems in the Analysis of Events’ which was not published until five years later (Schwimmer 1978), but it was reprinted fairly soon in Foster and Brandeis (1980), then again in Chapman (1989). Suffice to say here that this essay contains many ideas important to semasiology, for example, “Modes of Specification” (1989[1973]: 92), “A Simultaneity” (1989[1973]: 93) and “The Mode of Registration” (1989[1973]: 95). 29

We cannot, however, finish our discussion without reference to a highly significant philosophical component of semasiological theory: two paradigms of action (Harré 1970: 266-268). The significance of these paradigms lies in the fact that it affects the foundations upon which semasiology rests with regard to human movement itself. 30

Human Power and Two Paradigms of Action

Paradigm 1. Descartes Paradigm. A stationary ball resting on a smooth table is struck by a moving ball. It begins to move and continues moving. The ball which struck the stationary ball continues on but moves less quickly. We are strongly tempted to think of this happening as a transaction in which the totality of the effect is due to the originally moving ball, and to suppose that the stationary ball contributes nothing to the final situation. The second ball which originally was stationary has no intrinsic power of motion, though it can move. Looking deeper and farther into this paradigm, we can ask about the origin of motion of the first ball: that which was originally moving. Did it possess its motion intrinsically did it move of itself? ... This paradigm ... is not a straight metaphysician’s crib from the science of mechanics. In that science, the final state of a system of bodies is a product of two factors, an extrinsic factor which is the various states of motion of the balls before they collide, and an intrinsic factor, which is the inertia or mass of the balls. Inertia is ... a negative power, the power to resist indefinite increments of motion ... The application of the Cartesian paradigm requires us to suppose that in all action the effect is completely produced by the impressed or stimulating cause (Harré 1970: 266-67).

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29 To review ‘the Events paper’, as I have others in this volume is impossible because of spatial limitations and because it raises not “root”, but “branch” issues in semasiology. There will be another time and another opportunity to undertake the task.

30 The citation I use is the same citation as that in the D. Phil. However, Harré and Madden (1975: 82-100—Chapter Five, ‘Causal Powers’) contains the paradigms, but with fuller discussion of the notion of ‘powers’ in which some students may be interested.